This paper is about the genesis of the East Asian crisis. Why did it happen ? How could it, especially the contagion, happen ? Both legitimate causes (managed exchange rates, over and undervalued currencies) and illegitimate causes (crony capitalism, asset bubbles, Japanese devaluation, or “too much” capital account liberalization) are examined. A large part of the analysis centers around the proposition that the regime of managed, or fuzzy-logic exchange rate regimes, was at the core of the problem. In addition to managed exchange rates, the paper offers an additional contributory cause of the crisis - China’s mercantilist policy. The role of the international system in allowing China to devalue its currency (by over 50 percent ), despite burgeoning trade surpluses, is addressed. The paper also explores the question of whether the Chinese economy needed any devaluation in the early nineties. Objections to the important contributory role of this Chinese devaluation are examined in detail, and found wanting.