There are good reasons to analyze the recent voting behavior in some detail, for after a surplus of Lok Sabha elections, we may not have another for the next five. The first issue of interest is whether the major parties gained or lost because of alliances. In the case of the Congress, the answer is clear – the leadership-less Congress crashed to even a worse performance than the wholesale rejection of Mrs. Indira Gandhi in 1977. The numbers are revealing – at that time, Congress won 154 seats; today it just managed to cross double digits with 112. The share of the vote then – 34.5 %; today, 28.4 percent.

There are few defeats - in love, war or politics - that are more total. Thereasons for this debacle are three-fold: a self-inflicted own goal wound by theCongress in its pathetic acceptance of Mrs. Sonia Gandhi as a leader; Mrs.Gandhi's invocation of the Emergency Mrs. Gandhi as a role model,confirming that the people's rejection of Sonia had more to do with herrevealed incompetence as a politician than her Italian origins; and third, theeconomy was beginning to show signs of robustness. Indeed, an economyvoting model - one based on the assumption that people vote with theirstomachs and their pocketbooks - was the only forecast to be as right asright can be. (Developing Trends, Voting with the Economy, Aug. 31, 1999).The forecast vote share - 27.2 percent; forecast number of seats forCongress - 116. Analysis of whether the BJP helped its allies or vice-versa is notstraightforward. The BJP suffered a 2 % decline in vote share, but will likelyincrease its 1998 tally by four seats once all the results are in. In contrast, theBJP allies (BJP+) registered a marginal decline in vote share but obtained alarge increase in seats - from 70 in 1998 to 114 in 1999. A first impression isclearly that the allies helped the BJP more. This impression is wrong.

The whole does not reveal the parts. There were four different types ofelectoral contests in 1999. There was the one-on-one (Type I) fight betweenthe BJP and Congress in four states - Delhi, Gujarat, MP, and Rajasthan. Infive states, (Andhra, Karnataka, Orissa, Punjab and Haryana), the Congresswas pitted against a BJP alliance, and the fight was not contaminated by athird or fourth party. There were fights between the two alliances only (TypeIII) i.e. Bihar andTamil Nadu. And there were multi-party fights in three states(Type IV) - Maharashtra, UP and West Bengal. How is one to identify theindividual contributions from this "mess"?

There is a method. The two sets of results - Cong vs. BJP and Cong vs. BJP+- reveals that the answer is opposite to conventional wisdom and in favour ofthe BJP. In the four Type I states, the BJP had an average positive swing of5.7 percent, and gained a phenomenal 12 seats above an already large 60 (out of 98) seats. In Type II states (those that BJP fought with an ally), theBJP gained only 1 seat, and its average vote share went up by only 1.2percent. Thus, two comparable circumstances - BJP vs. Cong. and BJP+ vs.Cong, the unallied BJP (Type I contests) does considerably better.

What does the BJP do now, for itself and for India? The good news is that theBJP+ government is assured of stability. Further good news is provided bythe mandate given to Mr. Vajpayee in the overwhelming acceptance of him asa leader in preference to Sonia Gandhi (an additional confirmation that theBJP, because of Vajpayee, emerged as a better electoral vehicle than BJP+which was burdened by its alliance e.g. Karnataka.)

The bad news may be that the BJP will get complacent and mess up themandate. The further bad news is that there are clear signs that they havealready embarked on this suicidal path. Two pointers. First, a BJP official,somewhat pompously, somewhat arrogantly, and certainly ominously, statedlast week that the demands for early economic reforms were elitist, andrepresentative of a "US presidential style" mindset. (The 1999 vote was forMr. Vajpayee and against Mrs. Gandhi i.e. BJP's victory was the direct resultof a presidential contest that (now) some BJP officials are so contemptuousof. ) He then was quoted as stating that the BJP has a five year agenda socertainly one can wait. He probably added that India is an old civilization andwhat are a100 years, let alone five years, in the larger scheme of things.

The second pointer is provided by the BJP's inclusion of the late Mr. RajivGandhi in the Bofors chargesheet. This is politically wrong on at least twocounts. First, that if the future, and reforms, is the goal, then the BJP will findCongress support useful. This is only if Vajpayee is a man in a hurry. If theBJP has a 1000 year agenda, then clearly the path they have chosen is not incorrect.

Second, and this is even more shocking, the BJP should realize that Ms.Sonia Gandhi is their second best asset, after Mr. Vajpayee. As long as Mrs.Gandhi is the leader of the Congress, the party can at best achieve a dead-Congress bounce, and with little hope of striking alliances with able partners.If she is not the leader, the Congress can hope to be a formidable opposition- and along with BJP's complacent arrogance, a factor in their eventual downfall.

The grim conclusion is that complacency, brought about by political stability,is the nemesis of economic reforms, as it has been since 1984. Recall thatthen, after receiving a dynastic 415 seats, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi talked aboutreforms, and then squandered the mandate, and reforms, faster than a BMWzooms to 60 mph. The Narasimha Rao - Manmohan Singh reforms wereundertaken by a minority government amidst considerable political andeconomic uncertainty. Once Narasimha Rao got comfortable with a majorityin parliament (political stability) the reforms stopped.

Recall further that the United Front (UF) government undertook significantreforms with the unstable disadvantage of two Prime Ministers in eighteenmonths (1995-1997). Recall also the performance of a stable BJP (March 98to November 1998) and an unstable BJP (Dec 1998 to Sept. 1999). After theMarch 1998 elections, the BJP considered itself invulnerable and proceededwith anti-reform measures - explosion of nuclear bombs in May, and theeconomic budget bomb on June 1. But after its resounding defeat in Nov.1998, the BJP has talked, and delivered a significant set of reforms, whilebeing politically unstable. All the above six examples point to a simple reality- political stability can be bad for reforms.

Will the BJP now go the complacent Congress way? If they do, it will be badfor India - but the Indian will win out by voting out the BJP. Moral of Indianelections - do not, for your own sake, take the Indian voter for granted.